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Short title:  Analyzing conservation impacts  
 
 
Abstract  
Environmental conservation initiatives, including marine protected areas (MPAs), have proliferated 
in recent decades. Designed to conserve marine biodiversity, many MPAs also seek to foster 
sustainable development. As is the case for many other environmental policies and programs, the 
impacts of MPAs are poorly understood.  Social–ecological systems, impact evaluation, and 
common-pool resource governance are three complementary scientific frameworks for 
documenting and explaining the ecological and social impacts of conservation interventions. We 
review key components of these three frameworks and their implications for the study of 
conservation policy, program, and project outcomes. Using MPAs as an illustrative example, we then 
draw upon these three frameworks to describe an integrated approach for rigorous empirical 
documentation and causal explanation of conservation impacts. This integrated three-framework 
approach for impact evaluation of governance in social–ecological systems (3FIGS) accounts for 
alternative explanations, builds upon and advances social theory, and provides novel policy insights 
in ways that no single approach affords.  Despite the inherent complexity of social–ecological 
systems and the difficulty of causal inference, the 3FIGS approach can dramatically advance our 
understanding of and the evidentiary basis for effective MPAs and other conservation initiatives. 
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Introduction  
Recent decades have witnessed rapid growth in the diversity, abundance, and spatial extent of 
environmental conservation initiatives designed to conserve biodiversity and foster sustainable 
development.1–3  National parks, hunting regulations, endangered species legislation, pollution 
control laws, and other traditional state-centered regulatory policies have been joined by formal 
systems of payments for ecosystem services,4 community-based management,5,6 environmental 
certification,7 and natural resource privatization (e.g., privately protected areas, conservation 
easements, catch shares).8–10  Despite the growing number and diversity of conservation initiatives, 
the impacts of these interventions are often only poorly understood.11,12 
Marine protected areas (MPAs), a cornerstone of global efforts to conserve marine 
biodiversity and alleviate coastal poverty, typify the proliferation of conservation initiatives. Also 
known as marine reserves, sanctuaries, managed areas, and parks, an MPA is “any area of the 
intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical 
and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all 
of the enclosed environment.”13  The number and spatial extent of MPAs have increased several fold 
since 1990, accelerating in recent years, such that more than 12,000 MPAs now cover 8.4% of 
coastal waters and 3.4% of the global ocean.14,15  MPAs vary dramatically in size, regulatory 
restrictions, governance, and social and ecological contexts.16–18  MPAs are established for diverse 
reasons,19,20 often with multiple and sometimes conflicting goals: small, locally managed MPAs are 
often designed to enhance food security and manage data-poor fisheries,18 while large “Big Ocean” 
MPAs contribute to full representation of marine habitats and progress toward Convention on 
Biological Diversity targets for MPAs to cover 10% of the global ocean by 2020.14,15,21 
The ecological impacts of MPAs are highly variable, ranging from positive to negative.22–24  
MPA establishment often increases the density, biomass, size, and diversity of otherwise-exploited 
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species within MPA boundaries,23–25 with subsequent indirect impacts on other species through 
cascading ecological interactions (e.g., parrotfish increases, macroalgae declines, and subsequent 
coral recovery).26–28 Available evidence, although limited, suggests that MPAs that prohibit fishing 
can lead to enhanced ecological resilience, including resilience to climate fluctuations,29,30 storm 
disturbance,31 and invasive species.32  Corresponding impacts in areas adjacent to MPAs include 
increased larval recruitment,33 spillover of adult fish,34,35 and reduced fear behaviors among fish.36  
The wide variation in direction and magnitude of MPA ecological impacts has been attributed to 
MPA governance (e.g., MPA age, size, resource-use rules, compliance), management capacity (e.g., 
staff, budget),24 biophysical factors (e.g., isolation by deep water), and species traits (e.g., range or 
life history characteristics).37–40  A significant portion of the variability in ecological outcomes 
remains unexplained.23,24,41 
The social impacts of MPAs are widely debated and less well understood than their 
ecological analogues.22,42  The intended and unintended social impacts of MPAs vary across social 
domains,42,43 spatial and temporal scales,44 and within and among social groups.42,45 MPA 
establishment reallocates property rights46 over marine resources, thus restructuring relationships 
among stakeholders and transforming spatial and temporal patterns of fishing and other 
activities.47,48  In many cases, reallocation of MPA resource rights affects multiple dimensions of 
human well-being42,49 through processes mediated by the characteristics of individual resource users 
(e.g., gear type)42,44 and contextual characteristics (e.g., human population size).50  Resulting MPA 
impacts on economic well-being, cultural identity, and social conflict can be positive, neutral, or 
negative (e.g., Refs. 43 and 51–53).  Evidence suggests that MPAs significantly increase food security 
for most fisher subgroups,42 but the long-term health implications of MPAs for other health 
outcomes remain largely unexplored.54,55 The magnitude and direction of MPA social impacts are 
frequently dependent on scale, varying at different levels of social organization.44 Social impacts also 
vary in their degree of permanence,43 with some more likely to manifest almost immediately (e.g., 
resource rights)47 and others emerging over longer timescales (e.g., child nutrition).54 MPAs 
frequently confer economic benefits and costs to those who use MPA resources; these benefits and 
costs are often unequally distributed among individuals, among social groups, and across space and 
time.47,56–58 MPA economic benefits may include increased revenue from non-extractive uses and the 
capture of non-use value (e.g., donations, user fees).59–62  Conversely, extractive users may face 
significant opportunity and financial costs from MPA establishment.58,63 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
5 
Scholars and practitioners have proposed diverse analytic frameworks for monitoring and 
evaluating MPAs (e.g., Refs. 64–66) and analogous conservation initiatives (e.g., Refs. 67 and 68), but 
three distinct approaches have gained currency: social–ecological systems (SES), impact evaluation, 
and common-pool resource governance.69–71  A SES is an integrated system characterized by 
complex, interdependent, and reciprocal relationships between human society and ecosystems.72  
Impact evaluation, by contrast, is the systematic process of assessing the causal effects of a project, 
program, or policy.73  Common-pool resource governance refers to the system of decision-making 
arrangements, resource-use rights, monitoring and enforcement systems, and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms that shape human interactions with common-pool natural resources. To date, the 
relationships among these three approaches remain relatively unexplored. 
To further scientific efforts to document and explain variation in the impacts of conservation 
initiatives, we review the relationships among key components of SES, impact evaluation, and 
common-pool resource governance.  In particular, we examine the SES framework for classifying 
social–ecological variables, the research design tenets of impact evaluation, and hypotheses derived 
from theories of common-pool resource governance.  Using MPAs as an illustrative example, we 
then draw upon these three approaches to describe an integrated approach for rigorous empirical 
documentation and causal explanation of conservation impacts. This integrated three-framework 
approach to impact evaluation of governance in social–ecological systems (3FIGS) controls for 
alternative causal explanations, builds upon and advances social theory, and provides novel policy 
insights in ways that no single approach affords.  We conclude with a discussion of the merits and 
limits of 3FIGS for evaluation of MPAs and other conservation interventions. 
 
 
3FIGS conceptual foundations 
Social–ecological systems framework 
The SES framework is a hierarchical classification system that helps to “identify the basic working 
parts and critical relationships” that characterize coupled social and ecological systems.74 As part of 
the broader literature on SES,75–77 the SES framework “facilitate*s+ multidisciplinary efforts toward a 
better understanding of complex SESs”78––particularly those involving common-pool natural 
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resources.74  At its most basic, the SES framework categorizes the relationships and interactions (Fig. 
1; I) among specific actors (A), governance systems (GS), natural resource systems (RS), and resource 
units (RU)––and the social and ecological outcomes (O) that flow from these interactions. The 
interactions among these four subsystems (A, GS, RS, and RU) and the outcomes (O) that result from 
them are the products of a focal action situation (a situation in which inputs are transformed by 
multiple actors into outcomes);74 these subsystems, interactions, and outcomes are embedded 
within a broader social (S) and ecological context (ECO) that may shape––and be shaped by––the 
SES.78  Each subsystem comprises a specific set of attributes (Table 1), each of which can be further 
disaggregated.74,78,79 While higher-level attributes are universal to any SES, lower-level attributes are 
specific to particular systems.79,80 
The SES framework provides a heuristic tool for characterizing conservation interventions 
and their impacts.77 Conservation interventions are policies, programs, and projects––often novel 
governance systems––designed to shape the behavior of specific actors and thus conserve natural 
resources.81  These interactions are embedded within a broader social and ecological context that 
shapes––and is shaped by––the performance of the conservation intervention.16 Thus, rearranging 
the SES subsystems can highlight the relationships between a governance-focused conservation 
intervention and its impacts (Fig. 2).  As a classificatory system, however, the SES framework does 
not provide guidance regarding the hypothesized causal relationships among variables or the 
research designs one might employ to examine these relationships.74  
 
 
Impact-evaluation research design 
Impact evaluation places particular emphasis on research designs that permit causal inference.11,73  
Causal inference rests on the comparison of outcomes observed under an intervention with an 
estimate of what would have happened in the absence of that intervention (i.e., the 
counterfactual);82 this comparison provides an estimate of the intended and unintended impacts 
attributable to an intervention.73,82  Causal relationships between an intervention and its impacts can 
be explored with experiments (where random assignment to treatment and nontreatment groups is 
feasible)82 or, more commonly in SES, quasiexperiments that apply statistical techniques (e.g., 
regression discontinuity, matched comparisons, synthetic controls)73,82 to control for systematic 
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differences between treated (e.g., MPA) and untreated (e.g., non-MPA) groups.  Other research 
designs are also employed in impact evaluation (e.g., in-depth case studies), “though the credibility 
of their estimates of program effects relies on how well the studies’ designs rule out competing 
causal explanations.”83   
Central to impact evaluation is the exclusion of alternative explanations for the outcomes 
observed in intervention sites.84 Impact evaluations control for factors that may bias the magnitude 
or direction of impact estimates (e.g., attributes of the actors (A), resource systems (RS), and 
resource units (RU), and social and ecological context (S; ECO)),85 thus creating analyses of paired 
SES that vary only in their governance and, perhaps, in their outcomes (Fig. 3). All other subsystems 
(and elements) of the SES framework (e.g., GS) represent variables that researchers must control for 
(e.g., through randomization or statistical matching) or explicitly incorporate into analyses as 
explanatory variables. Where SES processes in an intervention influence the status of outcome 
variables (e.g., biomass, economic well-being, etc.) in non-intervention sites, appropriate impact 
evaluation design must also employ methods to eliminate bias arising from either leakage (e.g., the 
displacement of harvest effort from intervention to non-intervention sites)86 or spill-over effects 
(e.g., increased harvest in non-intervention sites, due to biomass increases generated by 
intervention).51 At their simplest, comparative analyses of these paired SES allow researchers to 
document the impacts of an intervention (e.g., Refs. 87 and 88), while emerging approaches 
highlight the potential to explore the mechanisms and pathways by which impacts occur (e.g., Ref. 
89), variation in impacts within and among groups, the attributes of an intervention that foster 
positive (or negative) impacts, and the contexts in which an intervention is most likely to succeed or 
fail.12,90  The SES framework provides a valuable heuristic for researchers attempting to identify and 
control for systematic biases that might confound the relationship between interventions and 
outcomes, precluding causal inference.  Substantial barriers to understanding the impact of 
interventions on SES remain, however, given that impact evaluation provides no guidance regarding 
the specific variables to measure in a given SES or the hypothesized relationships among them.91 
   
 
Common-pool resource governance theory 
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Theories of common-pool resource governance92–94 seek to explain the emergence, evolution, and 
performance of regimes governing common-pool natural resources and analogous systems. In 
common-pool resources, use is rival (i.e., use by one individual diminishes the resources available to 
another) and exclusion of potential resource users is difficult or costly, creating the potential for 
overexploitation of scarce resources.95,96  Theories of common-pool resource governance have 
highlighted four dimensions of governance that profoundly affect the performance of regimes 
governing fisheries, forests, grasslands, and other common-pool resources: decision-making 
arrangements (Table 1; GS6, GS7), resource use rights (GS4, GS5), monitoring and enforcement 
systems (GS8), and conflict-resolution mechanisms.78,92  In each of these four dimensions, research 
has identified variables hypothesized to shape outcomes in specific ways (Table 2).  Theories of 
common-pool resource governance also provide insights into the diverse factors that foster the 
emergence and evolution of governance regimes through collective action,92 highlighting the 
complex relationships among different components of the SES framework,78  Indeed, many elements 
of the SES framework have their origins in the early analytic frameworks of the literature on 
common-pool resource governance.77,97 
Originally developed in the context of small-scale common-pool resource systems,92,98,99 
theories of common-pool resource governance represent valid starting hypotheses for predicting 
impacts of conservation interventions in larger and more complex SES.77,78  Ostrom’s design 
principles for sustainable regimes,92,93 for example, are hypotheses to operationalize and test within 
an impact -evaluation research design (Fig. 4).  Though the large number of potential explanatory 
variables complicates hypothesis testing,94 and reductionist methods may obscure emergent 
properties,74,79 careful attention to research design can help to address these challenges.77,97  Thus, 
theories of common-pool resource governance have the potential to catalyze a substantive advance 
in the rigor and reach of impact evaluations.91  Likewise, rigorous research designs informed by 
impact evaluation may foster important insights into common-pool resource governance theory.  
 
 
Operationalizing 3FIGS: MPAs as an illustrative example  
MPAs illustrate the potential for an integrated three-framework approach to impact evaluation of 
common-pool resource governance in SES.  MPAs are an exemplar of an SES69,78 increasingly 
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examined through the lens of impact evaluation22,43,100 and the theories of common-pool resource 
governance.16,101  However, like studies of other conservation interventions, MPA research has yet to 
fully integrate the research questions, methods, and study designs of impact evaluation; the 
principles and hypotheses of common-pool resource governance theory; and the conceptual 
framework of SES.  Here, we outline the potential for 3FIGS to provide an integrated approach to 
examining the impacts of conservation interventions, drawing upon the SES framework (Fig. 1) to 
identify (A) the potential ecological and social outcomes of an intervention and (B) the confounding 
ecological and social processes to be controlled to obtain an unbiased estimate of MPA impacts.  
Having identified potential outcome variables, impact-evaluation research designs provide a 
methodology for documenting MPA impacts while controlling for confounding SES interactions and 
processes (Fig. 3). Finally, elements of common-pool resource governance, nested as differential 
treatments within an impact-evaluation research design, allows an examination of the mechanisms 
by which MPAs have ecological and social impacts (Fig. 4). 
 
 
MPA governance systemsc  
Governance constitutes the processes by which authority is conferred, by which authoritative 
decisions are made, and by which these decisions are enforced and modified.102–104  Governance is a 
principal component of SES,78 structuring human interactions across all levels of social organization 
(Fig. 2).104,105  Like many conservation interventions, MPAs are, essentially, novel governance systems 
that explicitly or implicitly define who may do what––and where, when, and how they may do it––
with respect to a specific, spatially bounded portion of the environment (denoted by blue elements 
in Fig. 2).16  In many cases, MPAs are layered upon existing marine governance systems, modifying or 
replacing the prior governance regime.  
The four principal components of MPA governance (decision-making arrangements, 
resource-use rules, monitoring and enforcement systems, and conflict-resolution mechanisms) 
                                                          
c
This section is adapted from and builds upon Ref. 16. 
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directly and indirectly shape human resource use patterns and, ultimately, the ecological and social 
impacts of MPAs.16  Each of these four elements may have both formal and informal components 
derived from diverse sources, including legal statutes, policy statements, judicial decisions, 
organizational practices, social norms, and cultural traditions. As a result, the de facto system of 
governance that actually governs an MPA often differs sharply from the de jure regime established 
through formal legal structures and policy processes.16  The de facto system of rules and the 
processes through which these rules are developed, implemented, and adapted over time 
significantly influence MPA impacts.   Specific governance characteristics––known as design 
principles––are associated with long-term sustainability in institutions governing common-pool 
resources,92 such as conservation interventions.22,106   
MPA decision-making arrangements specify the rights of individuals or groups to make 
choices regarding other aspects of MPA design and management. Decision-making arrangements 
shape rules governing resource use by defining the interests represented and manifested in 
policymaking processes.  Collective-choice rules (Table 1; GS6) determine, for example, who may 
participate in making decisions and who may not (e.g., government officials, resource users), how 
decision-makers are selected for their positions (e.g., elected or appointed), and how decisions are 
made (e.g., consensus or majority vote).92  Constitutional-choice arrangements (GS7) define how 
decisions are made regarding the configuration of collective-choice arrangements;92 these higher-
order social institutions shape both MPA governance and impacts by defining how site-level rules 
are made and who makes them.16  Subtle differences in the rules that govern MPA decision making 
may have significant impacts on MPA design, implementation, and evaluation (e.g., U.S. National 
Marine Sanctuaries).107  Governance regimes that recognize the rights of resource users to 
participate in decision making and to self-govern tend to be more effective than those that 
centralize authority in a few individuals or actors (Table 2).92  
Rules governing resource use (Table 1; GS4, GS5) are the second principal element of MPA 
governance. Resource-use rules (denoted by arrow 1 in Fig. 2)––including laws, regulations, formal 
and informal policies, codes of conduct, and social norms––specify the rights of individuals or groups 
to access and appropriate resources. Held by individuals, groups, organizations, or the state, these 
rights establish standards for interactions among individuals and between individuals and the marine 
environment (“actors” and “interactions” in Fig. 2). Infinite possible configurations of resource-use 
rules exist, ranging along a continuum from “open access” (i.e., no rules/any and all uses) to a 
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complete prohibition on human activities. Rules may apply to specific locations, times, resources, 
and actors.  Individuals or groups may be defined by actors’ identity, geographic proximity, tenure, 
activity type (e.g., consumptive vs. non-consumptive), intent (e.g., targeted species, recreational vs. 
commercial activity), or practices (e.g., fishing gear).  Consequently, the rules governing marine 
resources may shape the direction, magnitude, and distribution of MPA impacts.  Four attributes of 
resource-use rights are associated with sustainable governance systems: (1) clearly defined resource 
users, (2) clearly defined resources, (3) contextually appropriate resource-use rights, and (4) roughly 
proportional impacts on resource users.92,93  Unclear boundaries may limit the ability of resource 
users to develop appropriate rules and monitor compliance. Incongruent rules or those with 
disproportionate effects on particular social or economic groups may undermine compliance.92  
Ecologists also note that MPA age, size, location, spatial configuration, and fishing prohibitions––all 
manifestations of resource-use rights––often shape MPA impacts (Table 2) (e.g., Refs. 38, 39, and41 
). 
MPA monitoring systems (Table 1; I9, GS8) seek to track changes in the state of MPA-
associated social and environmental systems. MPA monitoring systems vary in what they measure 
and who does the measuring, as well as where, when, and how measurements are made. 
Monitoring can provide decision makers with insights on social and ecological conditions (ambient 
monitoring), track the progress of management actions toward a specified goal (performance 
measurement), or document the intended or unintended impacts of MPA establishment (impact 
evaluation).90  In addition, the involvement of resource users and other nonscientists in formal data 
collection and analysis (i.e., participatory monitoring) may also provide a mechanism for increasing 
awareness, improving resource management, and empowering communities.108  In practice, 
relatively few MPAs have comprehensive monitoring systems; resource users, managers, and other 
stakeholders often informally monitor environmental and social indicators to assess MPA 
performance (Table 2).16 
Sanctioning systems (Table 1; GS8) attempt to increase compliance with rules governing 
resource use by monitoring user behavior (I9) and punishing those engaged in prohibited activities. 
By increasing the severity and likelihood of sanctions and thus raising the opportunity cost of 
noncompliance, enforcement systems act directly on resource users to foster adherence to 
established rules.  Research highlights six attributes of monitoring and sanctioning systems that are 
hypothesized to enhance performance of MPAs and other natural resource governance regimes: 
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monitoring systems that assess (1) resource conditions and (2) user behavior; and (3) ensure 
accountability to users; and enforcement systems with (4) meaningful but (5) graduated and (6) 
context-dependent sanctions, which ensure that the punishment fits the crime (Table 2).92  
Lastly, conflict-resolution mechanisms are formal and informal processes for resolving 
disputes. Conflict-resolution mechanisms permit information exchange, clarification of resource-use 
rights, and adjudication of disputes related to decision making, resource use, monitoring, and 
enforcement. Though not highlighted in the SES framework, readily accessible and low-cost conflict-
resolution mechanisms enhance regime performance by mitigating social conflict and thereby 
minimizing resource overexploitation and dissipation of benefits from common-pool resources.92  
Conflict-resolution mechanisms also enhance MPA performance by giving voice to aggrieved parties 
and acknowledging their concerns, which increases the legitimacy of MPA rules and regulations.  
Evidence suggests that (1) rapid, (2) low-cost, and (3) easily accessible conflict resolution 
mechanisms are more likely to facilitate negotiation between actors than more complex, expensive, 
or remote systems (Table 2).92 
 
 
Resource-use patterns: actors and their interactions 
MPA governance regimes (Fig. 1; GS) directly and indirectly structure interactions (I) between 
humans (A) and marine species (RU) and ecosystems (RS) by defining the rules governing resource 
use and by shaping rates of compliance with these rules.  These patterns of consumptive and 
nonconsumptive resource access, use, and appropriation (shown in blue in Fig. 2; I1) may be 
characterized by five sets of variables: the resources used; demographic attributes of the users; 
location of use; timing of use; and mode of use.109  (In other words, what is being used by whom, 
where, when, and how?)  The demographics of resource use––who uses resources––can be 
characterized by both the number of users (A1) and their social attributes (A2; e.g., gender, age, 
class, place of residence, education, culture, ethnicity, and religion), though not all of these variables 
will be salient in all cases.  Actors’ past experiences (A3), mental models (A7), and degree of resource 
dependence (A8) also shape resource-use patterns. Location (A4) and timing of use also define 
resource-use patterns in simple but important ways.  Lastly, the mode (A9) and intensity of resource 
use, including both consumptive (e.g., fishing) and nonconsumptive practices (e.g., dive tourism), are 
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key characteristics of actors’ resource-use patterns.110 Resource-use patterns may vary in any one or 
all of these dimensions; these differences may lead to significant differences in the biological and 
social impacts of MPAs.37,109  
 
Resource systems, units, and interactions 
Resource-use patterns structure and are structured by characteristics of resource systems and 
resource units (as illustrated by green elements in Fig. 2). Most wild marine plants and animals 
(Table 1; RS1) are common-pool resources characterized by a high degree of rivalry and by difficulty 
of excluding others,92 though some marine species and ecosystems have distinctive characteristics 
(RU6) and clear boundaries (RS2) that facilitate exclusion.  The abundance (RU5), economic value 
(RU4), and spatial and temporal distribution (RS3, RS9, RU7) of marine resources all influence the 
likelihood of (un)sustainable use.  Similarly, resource productivity (RS5) and robustness 
(depletability; RU2)––the ability of a resource to sustain itself in the face of human use (e.g., based 
on population growth rates)––differentiate marine species and ecosystems from each other.111  
Resource mobility (i.e., spatial movement of the resource, independent of user actions; RU1) and the 
capacity for storage (i.e., capture and retain the resource for later use; RS8) are also key attributes 
that shape how humans govern and use marine resources.112  Additional biological attributes of 
living marine resources (e.g., species, size, sex, age, behavior) may shape how people interact with 
the marine environment and the impacts of these interactions.    
 
MPA outcomes 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that resource attributes, human resource-use patterns, 
and local context (discussed below) influence the ecological conditions (Table 1; O2) within and 
adjacent to an MPA.  Common population-level indicators of MPA ecological conditions include 
numeric density, biomass, and age and size structure of fish and invertebrates; ecological 
community-level indicators include species richness and diversity, trophic structure, and functional 
redundancy; and ecosystem-level attributes include habitat characteristics and key ecological 
processes (Table 3) (e.g., Refs. 113–115).  In general, increases in these metrics suggest positive MPA 
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impacts, although ecological dynamics associated with some “effective” MPAs may result in declines 
in some indicators (e.g., prey species decline following recovery of predators).116,117 
MPAs and other conservation interventions directly and indirectly influence human well-
being through multiple pathways and mechanisms.89,118  By introducing new systems of marine 
resource governance, MPAs may enhance or reshape the flows of marine ecosystem services,22,119 
including provisioning services (e.g., finfish and invertebrate fisheries); regulatory services (e.g., 
carbon sequestration); cultural services (e.g., tourism); and supporting services (e.g., biodiversity; 
Table 4).120–122  MPA governance regimes also define who may access these flows, reallocating the 
benefits of ecosystem services within and among social groups.47,123  Thus, MPAs shape the size of 
the marine resource pie (via ecosystem services), who gets a slice of the pie (via property rights), and 
the size of the slice allocated to each individual (via property rights).  In addition, the infrastructure 
and ideas associated with a conservation intervention may influence economic activities and social 
behavior, with direct and indirect consequences for human well-being (e.g., Refs. 124 and 125). 
The social impacts (Table 1; O1) of MPAs may be measured using diverse frameworks and 
indicators (e.g., UN Millennium Development Goals, UN Human Development Index).126,127  Each 
framework provides an alternative structure for characterizing human well-being, but they 
frequently share core constructs, such as economic well-being, health, security and political 
empowerment, education, and culture.22,43,128  Within each domain, indicators (Table 5) may be 
measured at one or more levels of social organization.129  In Indonesia, for example, indices of 
material assets measure economic well-being at household, 130 settlement (PODES),131 and district 
levels (e.g., Alor Dalam Angka).132  Measuring multiple dimensions of human well-being allows one 
to examine synergies, trade-offs, and equity among outcomes.123,133  
MPA impacts have ripple effects in space, time, and among outcomes (often referred to as 
“spillovers” or “leakage;” these impacts are both dynamic and complex, as studies of fishers have 
shown.57,63,134 For example, the redistribution of fishing effort from an MPA can increase the cost of 
fishing and lower profitability as a result of increased travel distance (and associated costs), 
increased exploratory fishing, and aggregation of fishing pressure in non-MPA locations.47,51,135 
Observational studies34,35,86,136 and bioeconomic models137,138 indicate that stock recovery and 
ecological spillover (net emigration of adult biomass and larvae) from areas where fishing is 
prohibited can result in increased fish abundance and catch per unit effort in fishable areas, thereby 
mitigating some or all of these costs.  In addition to changes in fishing costs and catch, shifts in the 
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catchability of target species and redistribution of fishing effort result in market feedbacks (e.g., 
prices, quantity demanded and supplied); fishers may subsequently adapt by changing their harvest 
strategies.44,51,57  Bioeconomic models and theory provide insights into these complex interactions 
and adaptive behavioral strategies, predicting how MPA economic impacts will vary over time and 
space (e.g., Refs. 63, 137, and 139).  These spillovers influence research design, necessitating that 
studies address the manner in which these ripple effects may influence observations in non-MPA 
locations. If spillovers result in improved ecological conditions at a control site, for example, this will 
reduce differences in conditions inside and outside the MPA, resulting in a more conservative 
estimate of MPA impacts.24  Establishing control sites at a distance beyond the expected influence of 
such spillovers allows for more reliable estimates of MPA impacts (see Ref. 70 and the case study 
described below). 
 
Context 
Elucidating the relationship between MPA interactions and outcomes requires controlling for 
contextual factors that may affect the likelihood of interventions or nature of impacts. Marine 
resource governance (Fig. 1; GS), human activities (I), and ecological and social outcomes (O), for 
example, are shaped by the ecological (ECO) and social, economic, and political (S) context within 
which they are embedded.78,140 Context may manifest in a variety of ways, across a variety of scales, 
influencing the likelihood of a conservation intervention occurring,18 its governance 
characteristics,141 and, ultimately, its social and ecological impacts.70  Controlling for context––and 
other exogenous factors––allows one to measure the impact of an MPA by isolating the causal 
relationship between the intervention (i.e., MPA establishment) and its impacts (i.e., resultant 
changes in ecological and social conditions). 
 Biophysical context (ECO) has a substantive effect on marine resource governance, human 
behavior, and site-level social and ecological conditions.  Conservation interventions are 
preferentially established in areas of high biological importance (e.g., high biodiversity or 
endemism)142,143 and low-opportunity costs of conservation (e.g., remote areas),144,145 with MPAs 
predominantly occurring in coastal areas146––all illustrations of selection bias in the siting of MPAs. 
Biophysical context also structures historic and current human uses of the marine environment in 
and around MPAs; for example, upwelling areas of high productivity are often targeted by fishers, 
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while high wave exposure can deter small-scale fishers.147  Large-scale biophysical factors, such as 
temperature, productivity, habitat connectivity, and vulnerability to large storms, have shaped 
present-day ecosystems and continue to influence MPA ecological conditions.148  Localized 
biophysical characteristics (e.g., wave exposure, depth, reef type, and benthic habitat 
characteristics) similarly influence the ecological community structure of MPAs and MPA responses 
to natural and anthropogenic disturbances––and conservation interventions.149,150  For example, the 
ecological recovery of corals within MPAs, which are associated with increases in herbivorous 
parrotfish, can be greater in sheltered areas where algae grow slowly.151  These biophysical 
characteristics may subsequently influence MPA impacts on human well-being, through ecological 
changes that have cascading effects on social conditions (e.g., ecosystem productivity may influence 
the intensity, duration, and yield of fishing efforts).  
Social context (S) also shapes marine resource governance, human activities, and social and 
ecological impacts.  Social structure influences the probability of collective action and self-
governance, with decentralized governance structures more likely to emerge where the probability 
of local collective action is high.152  Traditions of customary marine tenure, for example, may foster 
local MPA establishment.6  At the same time, a lack of human capacity may limit the potential for 
MPA co-management or collaborative adaptive management.153  National social context, by 
contrast, explains little variation in MPA abundance and spatial extent;18 for example, fishers per 
capita does not influence MPA establishment at the national level.18  Social structures (e.g., 
occupational structures, resource dependence) also shape MPA use rights and other aspects of 
marine resource governance.141,154  Differences in social systems (e.g., societal values, demographic 
trends (S2)) may also influence MPA impacts; social cohesion, for example, correlates positively with 
fisheries management outcomes.155  
Similarly, economic context influences marine resource governance, human activities, and 
ecological and social conditions. MPAs are often situated where opportunity costs for extractive uses 
are low,145 creating considerable selection bias that must be accounted for when comparing MPA to 
non-MPA locations.70  Market access (Table 1, S5), for example, may influence MPA establishment 
and governance,141  Market access also influences resource use and ecological conditions, as well as 
human well-being in coastal settings;140,156,157  economic development has also been linked to fish 
biomass.158  Market access may also influence the extent to which local communities depend on 
marine resources, which, in turn, may mediate the magnitude of MPA impacts on human well-
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being.42,63  For example, households with high dependence on marine resources are more likely to be 
impacted by the reallocation of resource rights linked to MPA establishment.42  More broadly, the 
economic value of fishery resources has been shown to determine when and where fisheries 
develop159 and whether overexploitation is likely to occur.160 Fishing activity is heavily influenced by 
the opportunity costs of fishing (i.e., the next best alternative income)63 and economic incentives, 
where fishing costs (including distance) and expected returns (price, catch per unit effort) influence 
fishing locations, intensity, frequency, and gear choice.44,57  
Lastly, political context (S) may also shape marine resource governance, human activities, 
and social and ecological conditions.6,18,69,157 Country-level governance characteristics (e.g., political 
stability (S3), voice and accountability) do not appear closely correlated with MPA establishment, 
though enabling legislation can accelerate MPA establishment (e.g., the Philippines),18 and shifts in 
marine resource governance may track the evolution of governance in postcolonial states.6  
Decision-making arrangements may also influence MPA size and location; scattered evidence 
suggests that decentralization policies foster many small coastal MPAs, whereas centralized decision 
making is associated with fewer, larger, and more remote MPAs.18,161  One might expect rule of law, 
corruption, accountability, and other contextual political factors to shape human behavior within 
MPAs––and MPA impacts––through macrolevel influences on fishing practices, tourism, or land use, 
but research has not yet examined these relationships fully (but see Ref. 162). The history of marine 
resource governance may shape ecological and social context and thus the probability of MPA 
establishment and/or the nature of MPA impacts, though rigorous research designs should control 
for such histories and other aspects of political context (for an example, see Box 1).  
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Understanding what works and what does not and why there is a difference in outcomes are 
fundamental challenges for conservation science and policy.  A longstanding focus on ecological 
dynamics and human threats to biodiversity have led much of conservation to focus on what to 
conserve and where to do so.165,166  A proliferation of initiatives, employed by government agencies 
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and nongovernmental organizations, has emerged in response to these threats.2  The limited 
scientific inquiry into the impacts of these initiatives––both to make sense of the world and to 
inform effective policy––has been plagued by a lack of social theory91 and by weak research designs 
that fail to control for alternate explanations of observed outcomes.11  The social impacts of 
conservation interventions remain particularly poorly understood.22,167  As a result, in many cases, 
conservation policymakers are shooting in the dark, not knowing which interventions work and 
which do not.11,168,169 
The 3FIGS approach provides a novel and robust means for documenting and explaining the 
intended and unintended impacts of MPAs and analogous biodiversity conservation interventions.  
Impact evaluations of terrestrial and freshwater protected areas, for example, could readily adopt 
the 3FIGS framework and adapt the MPA example to other biomes.  Similarly, 3FIGS could be readily 
adapted for other place-based conservation interventions that focus on resource governance, such 
as forest and fisheries certification, payments for ecosystem services, and community-based natural 
resource management.  For conservation interventions that focus on mechanisms other than 
governance (e.g., environmental education, economic reforms), the theoretical component of 3FIGS 
can be modified from common-pool resource governance to accommodate other social theories and 
associated hypotheses (e.g., theories of planned behavior, commodity chains). Appropriate research 
designs, theories, and conceptual frameworks allow one to measure the direction, magnitude, and 
distribution of social and ecological impacts that emerge from conservation interventions, as well as 
the heterogeneity of these impacts among groups and across space and time. Examining MPAs and 
other conservation interventions as policy experiments provides the basis for both better 
understanding the world around us and designing more effective conservation interventions.11,170,171 
 
 
Caveats 
Despite the power of a 3FIGS approach, however, integrating impact-evaluation research 
design, the SES conceptual framework, and hypotheses from common-pool resource 
governance theory is not a silver bullet for understanding the complex synergies and trade-
offs that may emerge from MPAs and other conservation interventions. Furthermore, which 
interventions work and which do not may depend on the context, which is important for the 
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interpretation and the transferability to other contexts of impact evaluation results, which 
have high internal validity but low external validity. Consequently, the practical application 
of the 3FIGs approach may be easiest where harvested species have limited mobility 
(minimizing spillover effects) and where an intervention affects a subset of the SES resource 
(creating a pool of viable control sites). The reductionist framework provided by impact 
evaluation imposes clear limits, both practical (e.g., complexity of sampling design)82 and 
analytic (e.g., subgroup treatment effects),172,173 on the scope of any given analysis; a 
reductionist approach may be insufficient to understand the full suite of feedbacks and 
interactions between social–ecological domains that are known to exist but remain poorly 
documented.174  A classic example is “fishing the line,”175 where an ecological response (i.e., 
higher fish abundance in the MPA spilling over beyond the boundary) drives a change in 
human behavior (i.e., spatial reallocation of fishing effort to the MPA boundary), which, in 
turn, may alter the ecological response (i.e., differential mortality rates alter fish behavior, 
lowering fish density close to MPA boundaries).175  Similarly, identifying the unique 
contributions of factors that may co-vary with governance represents a substantive 
challenge; for example, administrative activities and capacities, such as management plans, 
budgets, and staffing, have been hypothesized to shape impacts of MPAs and other 
conservation interventions,176 but supporting evidence is weak.177–181 However, a recent 
study examining the relationship between management capacity and ecological 
performance of MPAs has shown that capacity gaps (e.g., budget and staffing) may explain 
unrealized conservation potential of MPAs.24  
While novel analytical approaches (e.g., Ref. 89) increasingly enable researchers to explore 
complex causal mechanisms and interaction effects, minimum viable sample size182 and the danger 
inherent to multiple hypothesis testing183 impose hard limits on model specification.  In effect, the 
analytic constraints of impact evaluation will require scholars to choose between (1) “black box” 
approaches that are blind to the governance attributes of the intervention to capture emergent 
properties and feedbacks between outcomes and (2) carefully bounded analyses that explore the 
relationships among a subset of governance hypotheses and outcomes.  Narrative or modeling 
approaches, buttressed by specific, testable hypotheses, may be required to disentangle complex 
interactions.184 
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Frontiers  
Novel data-acquisition tools and analytic techniques may enable scholars to provide insights on 
increasingly complex questions about the impacts of MPAs.  Crowd-sourced data and citizen science, 
for example, may provide an opportunity to build sufficiently large data sets to understand specific 
sets of emergent properties and interactions.  Recent high-profile MPA research has benefited from 
widespread observations by nonscientist scuba divers;38 marine citizen science has also been used to 
examine global population trends among manta rays.185  Similarly, the increasing availability of 
government micro-data in online archives (e.g., the World Bank micro-data archives) will expand the 
geographic scope of global synthesis studies, including explorations of MPA social impacts.  
However, the emergence of Big Data alone will not be sufficient to provide empirical insights on 
3FIGS. Bayesian statistical techniques that allow for the integration of qualitative data into 
quantitative models (e.g., as informative priors) and enhanced ability to document the uncertainty 
inherent to specific estimates may both broaden the suite of hypotheses that can be addressed in a 
single model and provide more nuanced insights on the emergent properties of SES.   
Some familiar challenges will likely remain, despite novel data-acquisition approaches and 
analytic advances. Data-synthesis efforts require more data than can be gathered by individual 
researchers or research projects, particularly for interdisciplinary analysis.  Spatial or temporal 
overlap of ecological and social data-collection efforts is rare, and meaningful integration of 
multidisciplinary data sets poses both practical and theoretical challenges.22  MPA synthesis efforts 
based on published literature provide novel insights23,42 but are limited by methodological 
differences in underlying studies (which limit comparability). Synthetic analyses based on raw data 
are frequently constrained by the ability and willingness of researchers to share data and expertise.  
Research networks and standardized monitoring approaches provide a framework for data 
compilation and sharing while also addressing issues of data comparability. Forest- and 
development-focused research networks, for example, are generating substantive insights on the 
role of governance in shaping the effectiveness of interventions (e.g., International Forestry 
Resources and Institutions (IFRI); Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) ( www.povertyactionlab.org)).106 
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Conclusions 
Despite the challenges associated with impact evaluation of conservation interventions, key 
scientific and policy advances are possible through a 3FIGS approach.  In recent years, independent 
considerations of impact-evaluation research designs, hypotheses from common-pool resource 
governance theory, and the SES conceptual frameworks have provided novel insights into the 
performance of MPAs and other conservation interventions.  Scientists now have the opportunity to 
build upon the strengths of these three approaches to generate fundamental insights into how the 
world works––the essential basis for evidence-based policy.  The conservation community will never 
answer all of its questions, but greater conceptual clarity and analytic rigor will allow us to better 
understand how MPAs and other interventions shape society and the world around us. 
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Figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1. The first-tier variables within a social–ecological system (SES). “The subsystems are (i) 
resource systems (e.g., a designated protected park encompassing a specified territory containing 
forested areas, wildlife, and water systems); (ii) resource units (e.g., trees, shrubs, and plants 
contained in the park, types of wildlife, and amount and flow of water); (iii) governance systems 
(e.g., the government and other organizations that manage the park, the specific rules related to the 
use of the park, and how these rules are made); and (iv) users (e.g., individuals who use the park in 
diverse ways for sustenance, recreation, or commercial purposes). Each core subsystem is made up 
of multiple second-level variables (e.g., size of a resource system, mobility of a resource unit, level of 
governance, users’ knowledge of the resource system)... which are further composed of deeper-level 
variables.”68 Used with permission from McGinnis and Ostrom,64 adapted from Ref. 68. 
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Figure 2. The first-tier variables within a social–ecological system (SES), reorganized to emphasize 
the causal relationships between governance systems and outcomes. Conservation interventions 
often represent novel governance systems that induce a causal chain of events with intended and 
unintended consequences, feedback loops, synergies, and trade-offs. Related ecosystems (ECO) and 
social, economic, and political settings (S) in Figure 1 are collectively represented here as contextual 
variables. Solid lines represent direct links; dashed lines represent feedback mechanisms. Numbered 
arrows represent links labeled in Figure 1 as (1) “set rules for”; (2) “set conditions for”; (3) 
“participate in”; (4) “set conditions for”, (5) “are inputs to”; and (6) “are part of.” Numbered arrows 
(7–10) represent feedback mechanisms. 
 
Figure 3. Directed acyclic graph (DAG) illustrating how the essential social–ecological relationships 
may be examined through the lens of impact evaluation. Contextual variables in Figure 2 are 
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illustrated here as confounding variables that are explicitly controlled through research design. We 
use the term “impact” to denote a generic treatment effect (i.e., the causal impact of an 
intervention on a variable of interest) 
 
Figure 4. Alternative hypotheses from theories of common-pool resource governance examined 
through the lens of impact evaluations. The relative treatment effect of paired conservation 
interventions, representing the single null (Tri) or alternative common pool resource hypotheses 
(Trj) (e.g., protected area without active and accountable monitoring vs. protected area with active 
and accountable monitoring) can be examined through impact evaluation. Contextual variables in 
Figure 2 are illustrated here as confounding variables that are explicitly controlled through research 
design. We use the term “impact” to denote a generic treatment effect (i.e., the causal impact of an 
intervention on a variable of interest). “Comparative impact” refers to the net difference in 
treatment effects between conservation interventions i and j 
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Figure 5. Application of the 3FIGS approach to understand the impacts of marine protected areas in 
the Bird’s Head Seascape, Indonesia. Conservation interventions often represent novel governance 
systems that induce a causal chain of events with intended and unintended consequences, feedback 
loops, synergies, and trade-offs. Related ecosystems (ECO) and social, economic, and political 
settings (S) in Figure 1 are collectively represented here as contextual variables. Solid lines represent 
direct links; dashed lines represent feedback mechanisms. Numbered arrows represent links labeled 
in Figure 1 as (1) “set rules for”; (2) “set conditions for”; (3) “participate in”; (4) “set conditions for”, 
(5) “are inputs to”; and (6) “are part of.” Numbered arrows (7–10) represent feedback mechanisms. 
Grayed arrows and filled gray boxes represent elements of the social–ecological system that are 
explicitly controlled for through quasiexperimental research design. 
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Box 1.  3FIGS in action: impact evaluation of MPAs in the Bird’s Head Seascape, West Papua, 
Indonesia. 
 
In the Bird’s Head Seascape (BHS) of West Papua, Indonesia, an interdisciplinary teamd is applying 
the 3FIGS approach to document and explain the social and ecological impacts of MPAs (Fig. 5).70,130  
The BHS is recognized for its exceptional cultural and biological diversity, but human activities (e.g., 
destructive fishing practices, coastal sedimentation) have jeopardized both the ecological integrity of 
the region and the livelihoods of its resource-dependent residents.163  Given these challenges, local 
and international organizations partnered to establish 12 MPAs within the BHS, encompassing more 
than 35,000 km2.  Through these MPAs, “empowered and capable Papuan communities, 
governments, and local partners protect their critical coastal and marine ecosystems, thereby 
protecting the single greatest reservoir of tropical marine species on the planet, while enhancing 
food security, livelihood opportunities, as well as their cultural heritage and traditional ownership 
rights.”164  These MPAs, which include both multiple-use areas and no-fishing areas, establish 
preferential use rights for local residents that enable these residents to fish for subsistence and 
commercial use within the MPAs and empower them to exclude nonresidents ineligible to fish 
within the MPAs.   
To determine the social and ecological impacts of the BHS MPAs and to test the null 
hypothesis of “no impact,” the scientific team employed a quasiexperimental impact evaluation 
informed by SES to identify both outcome variables and potential confounders. To measure social 
impacts, the team first established baselines for eight MPAs and matched non-MPA controls.  In 
addition to basic demographic information, household surveys documented human well-being (O1) 
using more than 150 indicators across five social domains: economic well-being, health, political 
empowerment, education, and culture.  To identify non-MPA control households, the team used a 
multistep matching process at each MPA, designed to control for confounding processes (identified 
from the SES classificatory framework).  An initial coarse match identified non-MPA settlements with 
key characteristics similar to MPA settlements. Drawing on the SES framework, coarse matching 
variables included occupation, social structure, market access, political jurisdiction as proxies for the 
key attributes of context (S), resource systems (RS), resource units (RU), and actors (A) that may 
affect participation in an MPA or its outcomes.  After the team surveyed these settlements (having 
used power analysis to determine the appropriate sample sizes for each settlement and each MPA in 
its entirety), it used Mahalanobis metric matching (a nearest-neighbor statistical matching method) 
                                                          
d
The team is led by authors M.B. Mascia, H.E. Fox, L. Glew, and G. Ahmadia, as well as professor Fitryanti 
Pakiding of the University of Papua in Indonesia. 
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to identify pairs of MPA and similar non-MPA households with similar observable characteristics. 
Statistical matching procedures, within an impact evaluation research design, allowed the team to 
control for observable characteristics related to socioeconomic attributes (A2), ethnic composition 
(A6), and number of actors (A1) that could influence subgroup treatment effects (e.g., relative 
impacts on fisher vs. non-fisher households).  Baseline monitoring occurred in 2010–2012, following 
legal establishment of the MPAs and designation of boundaries, but before development of 
management plans and implementation of MPA zoning plans.  To minimize the potential for spillover 
or leakage effects to bias estimates of MPA social impacts, control households and their fishing 
grounds were identified beyond known distances for economically meaningful levels of fish 
population spillover.  Repeat data collection occurs at 2-year intervals until 4 years postbaseline, at 
which point monitoring will occur at 3-year intervals.  The team uses difference-in-difference 
estimates of statistically matched MPA and non-MPA households to calculate the average treatment 
effect (i.e., impact) of each MPA for each of the social indicators.  Demographic and spatial data 
allow the team to explore a targeted subset of spatial and temporal synergies, trade-offs, and equity 
within and among social groups and across domains of human well-being (O1), as well as to test 
hypotheses derived from theories of common-pool resource governance on the role of governance 
in shaping social impacts. 
 
To monitor the ecological impacts of BHS MPAs, the scientific team adopted an analogous 
research design to measure changes in common reef ecosystem indicators (O2).  Indicators included 
benthic (coral, other invertebrate and algal communities) and fish community attributes (e.g., 
abundance, size, and biomass of key reef species).  After initially establishing ecological baselines 
within MPA boundaries (2009–2011), the team subsequently employed coarse matching methods to 
identify corresponding non-MPA controls (based on 10 contextual variables describing structural, 
biophysical, and social features of coral reef sites (ECO, S))70 and completed ecological baselines in 
control sites in 2012.  Transect-to-transect statistical matching allows direct “apples-to-apples” 
comparisons of MPA and non-MPA coral reefs.  Subsequent monitoring is occurring at 2-year 
intervals through baseline +4 years, at which point monitoring will occur at 2- to 3-year intervals. To 
reduce the risk of contaminated estimates of ecological impacts, control sites were sited beyond 
estimated distances for ecologically meaningful levels of fish population spillover.70  As with social 
impacts, the team uses difference-in-difference estimates of changes in statistically matched MPA 
and non-MPA underwater transects to calculate the average treatment effect of each MPA across 
the ecological indicators.  Life history and spatial data allow the team to explore a targeted subset of 
spatial and temporal synergies, trade-offs, and heterogeneities within and among ecological groups 
and across domains of ecological condition (O2). Larval dispersal and fish migratory behaviors can 
generate large-scale spillover effects, constraining the effectiveness of conventional use of fixed 
distance to minimize bias arising from interactions between intervention and non-intervention 
sites.70  Consequently, estimates of MPA impact are interpreted with caution, particularly for highly 
mobile species.   
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To explain these social and ecological impacts and to test the null hypothesis that 
governance does not influence MPA outcomes, the team also monitors marine resource governance 
(decision-making arrangements (GS4), resource-use rights (GS5, GS6), monitoring and enforcement 
systems (GS8, I9, I10), conflict-resolution mechanism (I4)) in both MPA settlements and similar non-
MPA controls.130  Linked focus group discussions and key informant interviews provide data on key 
governance variables, allowing the team to test hypotheses derived from theories of common-pool 
resource governance. The team employs purposive sampling techniques to identify focus group 
participants and key informants in each settlement, given that knowledge of governance processes is 
not distributed uniformly or randomly among residents.  Data collection among settlements occurs 
over two sampling periods; the data are pooled to estimate values for each governance variable at 
each time step.  Governance data allow the team to explore the role of specific governance variables 
(GS) in shaping the direction, magnitude, and distribution of the social and ecological impacts of 
MPAs (O).   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  The second-tier variables of a social–ecological system (SES).   
 
First-tier variable Second-tier variable 
Social, economic, and political settings (S) S1 – Economic development 
 S2 – Demographic trends 
 S3 – Political stability 
 S4 – Other governance trends 
 S5 – Market stability 
 S6 – Media organizations 
 S7 – Technology 
Resource systems (RS) RS1 – Sector (e.g., water, pasture, forests, fish) 
 RS2 – Clarity of system boundaries 
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First-tier variable Second-tier variable 
 RS3 – Size of resource systems 
 RS4 – Human constructed facilities 
 RS5 – Productivity of system 
 RS6 – Equilibrium properties 
 RS7 –Predictability of system dynamics 
 RS8 – Storage characteristics 
 RS9 – Location 
Governance systems (GS) GS1 – Government organizations 
 GS2 – Nongovernmental organizations 
 GS3 – Network structure 
 GS4 – Property rights systems 
 GS5 – Operational-choice rules 
 GS6 – Collective-choice rules 
 GS7 – Constitutional-choice rules 
 GS8 – Monitoring and sanctioning rules 
Resource units (RU) RU1 – Resource unit mobility 
 RU2 – Growth or replacement rate 
 RU3 – Interaction among resource units 
 RU4 – Economic value 
 RU5 – Number of resource units 
 RU6 – Distinctive characteristics 
 RU7 – Spatial and temporal characteristics 
Actors (A) A1 – Number of relevant actors 
 A2 – Socioeconomic attributes 
 A3 – History or past experiences 
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First-tier variable Second-tier variable 
 A4 – Location 
 A5 – Leadership/entrepreneurship 
 A6 – Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital 
 A7 – Knowledge of SES/mental models 
 A8 – Importance of resource (dependence) 
 A9 –Technologies available 
Action situations: interactions (I) – outcomes (O) I1 - Harvesting 
 I2 – Information sharing 
 I3 – Deliberation processes 
 I4 – Conflicts 
 I5 – Investment activities 
 I6 – Lobbying activities 
 I7 – Self-organizing activities 
 I8 – Networking activities 
 I9 – Monitoring activities 
 I10 –Evaluative activities 
 O1 –Social performance measures (e.g., efficiency, 
equity, sustainability, accountability) 
 O2 – Ecological performance measures (e.g., 
overharvested, resilience, biodiversity, sustainability) 
 O3 – Externalities to other SESs 
Related ecosystems (ECO) ECO1 – Climate patterns 
 ECO2 – Pollution patterns 
 ECO3 – Flows into and out of focal SES 
NOTE: Colors correspond to first-tier variables in Fig. 1.  Data is derived from Ref. 75; the table is 
adapted from Ref. 78.   
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Table 2.  Domains of marine protected area (MPA) governance, hypothesized attributes of 
successful MPA governance, and illustrative indicators to monitor.16,22,130   
Domain  Hypothesized attribute Illustrative indicator 
Decision-making 
arrangements 
Resource users participate in decision 
making 
Proportion of user groups participating in 
decision to establish MPA 
 Resource user may self-govern resource 
use 
 
Proportion of users whose right to self-
organize is minimally recognized by 
government 
 
Resource-use 
rights 
Resource users defined clearly Proportion of important users subject to 
specific appropriation rule. 
 Resources defined clearly Proportion of MPA boundary clearly 
demarcated to users 
 Resource user costs and benefits 
roughly proportional 
MPA cost–benefit ratio to resource users 
 Resource user rights linked to local 
conditions 
 
Proportion of MPA rules context dependent  
Monitoring and 
enforcement 
systems 
Monitors assess resource conditions Ecological monitoring patrol frequency 
 Monitors assess user behavior Compliance monitoring patrol frequency 
 Monitors are resources users or are 
accountable to users 
Sanctions for failing to monitor resource 
 Sanctions for noncompliance likely Frequency of sanctions for noncompliance 
 Sanctions for noncompliance graduated Mean types of sanctions levied for 
noncompliance 
 Sanctions for noncompliance context 
dependent 
Mean number of contextual factors 
considered when imposing sanction for 
noncompliance 
 
Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
accessible to users 
Mean time/cost to resolve conflict 
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NOTE: Domains, hypothesized attributes, and illustrative indicators derived from theories of 
common-pool resource governance.92,93 
 
Table 3. Ecological domains, attributes, and illustrative indicators of the ecological impacts of 
marine protected areas (MPAs).113–115  
 
Domain Attribute Illustrative indicator 
Population Numeric density Count of individuals per unit area  
 Biomass Abundance multiplied by mean weight 
 Age structure Frequency distributions of age classes 
 Recruitment  Count of larvae per unit area 
   
Community Species richness Number of species per survey 
 Species diversity Simpson diversity index 
 Trophic structure Distribution of trophic levels in species assemblage 
 Functional redundancy Number of species within functional groups 
   
Ecosystem  Productivity Fishery production 
 Habitat characteristics Extent 
 Coastal processes Sediment cycling 
 Herbivory 
 
Grazing rates 
 
 
Table 4. Ecosystem service domains, attributes, and illustrative indicators of the ecosystem service 
impacts of marine protected areas (MPAs).120–122  
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Domain Attribute Illustrative indicator 
Provisioning Fisheries Fisheries catch 
 Materials Volume mined  
Supporting Biodiversity Number of species  
Regulatory Carbon sequestration Mangrove biomass 
Cultural Tourism Annual value of tourism 
 Recreation Scuba diving annual value 
 Existence values Non-use existence value 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Social domains, attributes, and illustrative indicators of the impacts of marine protected 
areas.   
 
Domain  Attribute Illustrative indicator 
Economic well-being Occupation Primary occupation 
 Economic status Household material assets index 
Trend in economic status 
 Fishing characteristics Primary fishing technique 
Household dependence on marine protein 
Economic dependence on marine fisheries 
Health Food security Household food security index 
Child food security index 
Catch per unit effort 
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 Birth rate Birth rate 
Adolescent birth rate 
 Mortality  Infant mortality rate 
Under-five mortality rate 
Adult mortality rate 
 Morbidity Household disease rate 
Household disease burden 
Political empowerment Resource rights Household marine tenure index 
 Community organization Participation in community groups  
Financial contribution to marine community groups 
Female participation in marine community groups 
 Political engagement Voting rates 
Education Formal education Adult literacy rates 
School enrollment rates 
 Environmental education  Awareness of threats to marine environment 
Awareness of marine conservation actions 
Culture Place attachment Mean place attachment 
 Social conflict Trends in social conflict 
 
NOTE: All indicators may be disaggregated by demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, wealth, 
education, class) to explore the distributive impacts of MPAs.42,47,118,130 
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